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We often make decisions with uncertain consequences. The outcomes of the choices
we make are usually not perfectly predictable but probabilistic, and the probabilities
can be known or unknown. Probability judgments, i.e., the assessment of unknown
probabilities, can be influenced by evoked emotional states. This suggests that also
the weighting of known probabilities in decision making under risk might be influenced
by incidental emotions, i.e., emotions unrelated to the judgments and decisions at
issue. Probability weighting describes the transformation of probabilities into subjective
decision weights for outcomes and is one of the central components of cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) that determine risk attitudes. We hypothesized that music-evoked
emotions would modulate risk attitudes in the gain domain and in particular probability
weighting. Our experiment featured a within-subject design consisting of four conditions
in separate sessions. In each condition, the 41 participants listened to a different kind
of music—happy, sad, or no music, or sequences of random tones—and performed
a repeated pairwise lottery choice task. We found that participants chose the riskier
lotteries significantly more often in the “happy” than in the “sad” and “random tones”
conditions. Via structural regressions based on CPT, we found that the observed changes
in participants’ choices can be attributed to changes in the elevation parameter of the
probability weighting function: in the “happy” condition, participants showed significantly
higher decision weights associated with the larger payoffs than in the “sad” and “random
tones” conditions. Moreover, elevation correlated positively with self-reported music-
evoked happiness. Thus, our experimental results provide evidence in favor of a causal
effect of incidental happiness on risk attitudes that can be explained by changes in
probability weighting.
Keywords: decision making, happiness, incidental emotions, music, probability weighting, prospect theory, risk,
risk aversion
INTRODUCTION
Making decisions under risk is an integral part of our lives: we
order meals that we have not tried yet, buy products that we
have never used before, and we decide how to invest money
for ourselves, for friends, or for customers. In both economics
and psychology, risk is often understood as a function of the
variability of outcomes. People’s attitudes toward this variabil-
ity differ substantially (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011) and can
be characterized by their degree of risk aversion (or risk procliv-
ity, respectively). A risk-averse person prefers a sure outcome over
any gamble that has the same expected value; for a risk-loving per-
son, the opposite holds (Wakker, 2010, p. 52). For instance, a risk
averter prefers C5 for sure over the gamble that pays C10 with a
probability of 75% and −C10 with 25% probability.
In (cumulative) prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), risk attitudes expressed
in people’s decisions are attributed to several constructs that
describe how the available options are subjectively evaluated. The
three constructs are (1) comparison of the objective outcomes
with a reference point, (2) transformation of the resulting gains
and losses into subjective values, and (3) transformation of the
objective probabilities associated with the possible outcomes into
subjective decision weights for those outcomes. The two subjec-
tive transformations are formalized by the value function and
the probability weighting function, respectively. Both functions
are thought to reflect the often observed psychophysical char-
acteristic of diminishing marginal sensitivity, i.e., less sensitivity
to changes in outcomes and probabilities, the farther they are
away from the respective reference points. This results in a convex
value function for losses and a concave value function for gains.
For gains and losses, the reference point can be, for instance,
the status quo (i.e., the current wealth level). For probability
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weighting, the extreme cases of impossibility (p = 0) and cer-
tainty (p= 1) are the two natural points of reference (Fox and
Poldrack, 2013). This results in an inverse S-shaped form of the
probability weighting function, reflecting the common empiri-
cal finding that small probabilities are overweighted and large
probabilities are underweighted.
Studies that used semiparametric (Abdellaoui et al., 2011) or
parametric (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010) specifications of the value
and the probability weighting function suggest that probability
weighting is more susceptible to situational influences than out-
come valuation. As a consequence, there is increasing interest in
the factors that determine the shape of the probability weighting
function—especially its two main characteristics, curvature and
elevation (see the discussion in Gonzalez and Wu, 1999).
One important factor that influences probability weighting
seems to be affect, as several theoretical accounts of the deter-
minants of probability weighting suggest. According to one
account, the commonly observed inverse S-shape of the prob-
ability weighting function results from anticipated elation or
disappointment regarding the future realization of an uncertain
payoff (Gul, 1991; Brandstätter et al., 2002; Walther, 2003). For
instance, one might anticipate disappointment from a failure to
achieve a highly probable gain. This in turn is thought to trans-
late into decision weights for high probabilities that are lower than
the actual probabilities.
In a similar vein, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) hypothesized
that the extent of probability weighting depends on the “affective
richness” of potential outcomes. Confirming their hypothesis, the
authors found that “affect-rich” outcomes—i.e., outcomes which
participants anticipate to elicit strong emotional reactions (such
as receiving an electric shock or a kiss)—were associated with
more pronounced probability weighting than less “affect-rich”
outcomes (such as receiving money). The authors speculated
that hope and fear generated by affect-rich outcomes give rise to
the shape of the probability weighting function. Although these
studies focused on the curvature of the probability weighting
function, it has been pointed out that also the elevation parameter
might capture an emotional influence (Rottenstreich and Hsee,
2001).
Importantly, not only emotions related to the decision out-
comes might be reflected in probability weighting. Even inci-
dental emotions, which are characterized by being unrelated to
the judgments and decisions at issue (Loewenstein and Lerner,
2003; Weber and Johnson, 2009), were found to have an influ-
ence on probability judgments, i.e., the assessment of unknown
probabilities. For instance, happy people made more optimistic
probabilistic judgments and sad people more pessimistic judg-
ments (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Wright and Bower, 1992). It
is thus plausible that similar effects are observable in the subjec-
tive weighting of known probabilities in decision making under
risk. The elevation of the probability weighting function is thus
a promising target of affect, with greater elevation representing
more optimistic attitudes and reduced elevation more pessimistic
attitudes toward risky situations.
While there is a considerable body of evidence on the influence
of incidental emotions on decision making under risk, only a few
studies linked incidental emotions specifically to the constructs
postulated by cumulative prospect theory (CPT). For instance,
Isen et al. (1988) found that positive affect made participants
value losses more negatively, while it had no significant effect
on the valuation of gains. Thus, positive affect made participants
more loss-averse. The authors, however, restricted their design to
two-outcome lotteries with 50%/50% probabilities and did not
investigate the role of probability weighting. In a recent study,
Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) provided correlational evidence that they
interpreted as an effect ofmood on the elevation of the probability
weighting function for both gains and losses in women, but not in
men. Women that regarded the current day to be more promising
than usual made decisions that are consistent with more opti-
mistic probability weighting. A similar link was also suggested in
another study that revealed a correlation between seasonal and
weather conditions and probability weighting, which the authors
also interpreted as mood effects (Kliger and Levy, 2008).
Studies without direct manipulation and measurement of
affective states leave open the question whether incidental emo-
tions are indeed the mediator of the effects mentioned above.
To answer this question, it is necessary to establish a causal
effect of incidental emotions on risk attitudes that is consistent
with probability weighting in particular. One way to prove a
causal effect is to experimentally manipulate incidental emotions,
record participants’ self-reported emotions, and investigate the
emotion-induced changes in probability weighting.
To this end, we employed a variant of the Random Lottery
Pairs procedure (Hey and Orme, 1994) and manipulated emo-
tions within-subject by playing different types of music to our
participants. They listened to happy and sad music as well as to
sequences of random tones or to no music at all.
To determine whether the emotion manipulation had an effect
on participants’ decision making, we compared the frequencies
with which they chose the riskier lotteries between conditions.
Furthermore, we estimated preference parameters via structural
regressions based on CPT and tested whether probability weight-
ing changed between conditions.
Based on the studies that established a link between inciden-
tal emotions and optimistic or pessimistic probability judgments
(JohnsonandTversky, 1983;Wright andBower, 1992),wehypoth-
esized that probability weighting in decision making under risk
wouldbeaffectedinasimilarway. Specifically,wehypothesizedthat
participants in the “happy” condition exhibit increasedprobabilis-
tic optimism in the sense that they attach higher decision weights
to the larger outcomes. In contrast, listening to sad music should
lead tomore pessimistic probability weighting, i.e., lower decision
weightsassociatedwith the largeroutcomes.Weexpectedthiseffect
to manifest itself also in a relationship between the self-reported
emotional state and the extent of probability weighting.
Because an increased elevation of the probability weighting
function implies a reduction in risk aversion (see Wakker, 2010,
chapter 5), it follows from these hypotheses that participants
should choose the riskier lottery more frequently after listening
to happy music than after listening to sad music.
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that the intensity of
evoked emotions gradually decreases over time (Isen et al., 1972;
Isen and Gorgoglione, 1983; Gard and Kring, 2007; Andrade
and Ariely, 2009). Thus, we hypothesized that music-evoked
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emotional effects on risk attitudes would be strongest at the
beginning and then diminish. This would corroborate an affective
interpretation of the effects on decision making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 46 participants through bulletin-board appeals at
Freie Universität Berlin and an e-mail mailing list to which
previous and prospective participants had subscribed. Four par-
ticipants had to be excluded from the analysis because they did
not participate in all sessions. One participant was dropped from
the analysis because she stated in the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire that she had chosen arbitrarily between the lotteries
presented. The remaining 41 participants (28 women; 13 men)
had amean age of 27.37 years (SD = 7.832 years). All participants
gave written informed consent prior to the experiment.
PROCEDURE
Experimental design
In a within-subject design, participants were exposed to auditory
stimulation: (1) happy or (2) sad music or (3) sequences of ran-
dom tones, while (4) nomusic was played in the fourth condition.
Each of the four experimental conditions was tested in a sepa-
rate session. The order of the conditions was randomized, and
all sessions were one week apart. In three of the conditions, up
to four participants were present in the lab simultaneously. Each
participant sat in front of a computer equipped with headphones
and enclosed in cubicles to prevent eye contact with the other
participants during the experiment. All tasks were presented on
a computer screen (except the post-experimental questionnaires,
which were handed out on paper), and all data were recorded
using the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.).
Responses were made via a standard keyboard.
Theexperimenterhandedout instructionsandreadthemaloud.
Subsequently, participants answered a quiz on the instructions to
make sure that they had understood the lottery choice task. At the
beginning of themusic conditions, participants shortly listened to
themusical pieces for familiarization. In the “nomusic” condition,
participants filled in the demographic questionnaires.
The main experiment started with the emotion evocation and
the emotional rating task (see below). In the “no music” condi-
tion, it started with the emotion rating task right away, while in
all other conditions, participants first listened to music for exactly
6min via headphones. The subsequent block of pairwise lottery
choices lasted approximately 10min, comprised 50 trials (plus five
initial learning trials), and was followed by the second emotion
rating task (see Figure 1). In each trial, participants were asked to
choose one of two lotteries within a time frame of 8 s. Participants
did not receive any feedback on earnings in-between trials. The
trials were separated by a variable interval (3–6 s), which served
as a short period of rest and as a means to minimize potential
anticipation effects and repetitive behavioral patterns. The entire
sequence was repeated—except for the familiarization phase and
the learning trials—so that each condition included two music
blocks, four emotion ratings tasks (two post-music, two post-
choice), and 100 lottery choices in total. The same set of 100
different lottery pairs (see Table A1 in the Appendix) was used
in each condition.
At the end of each session, participants filled in a questionnaire
concerningtheirchoicestrategiesandthoughtsontheexperiment’s
purpose. None of the participants mentioned any hypothesis
concerning an emotion-specific connection between the type of
music played and their level of risk aversion. After the final session,
participants learned their individual earnings and received them in
cash. These consisted of a randomly determined payoff according
to the gamble they had chosen in one randomly selected trial plus
the total attendance fee of C24 for all four sessions.
Musical stimuli
The musical stimuli were chosen to evoke (a) happiness, (b) sad-
ness, and (c) neither happiness nor sadness. The latter stimuli
we refer to as “random tones” (for the complete list of stim-
uli see Table A2). The happy pieces and random tone sequences
had been used in a recent study (Koelsch et al., 2013). Half of
the sad pieces were used by Pehrs et al. (2013), overlaid with an
acoustically identical electronic beat.
The happy pieces consisted of 12 instrumental excerpts of 30 s
duration each from various epochs and styles (classical music,
Irish jigs, jazz, reggae, South American, and Balkan music). Sad
pieces were classical and indie-pop pieces with a duration of 60 s
each, selected on the basis of features that have been shown to
evoke sad feelings, i.e., minor key, slow tempo, and low pitch vari-
ation (Juslin and Laukka, 2004; Lundqvist et al., 2009). The 12
random tone sequences featured acoustically changing stimuli of
30 s duration. These isochronous tones for which the pitch classes
were randomly selected from a pentatonic scale (see Koelsch
et al., 2013) were created with the help of the MIDI toolbox for
MATLAB (Eerola and Toiviainen, 2004).
The manipulation check revealed that the random tones were
not affectively neutral (see Results). Consequently, the “nomusic”
condition remains as the one condition in which the affective state
was not manipulated.
All stimuli were non-vocal pieces, edited with Praat (version
5.0.29, Boersma, 2002) to feature a 1.5-s fade-in and fade-out and
the same intensity (70 dB). The total duration of the sad music
pieces matched the total duration of the auditory stimulation in
the other conditions (i.e., 6min).
Emotion rating
In the computerized, self-paced emotion rating task, participants
reported their current emotional state by indicating the degree
to which they agreed with three statements concerning happi-
ness (“I am happy”), sadness (“I am sad”), and calmness (“I
am calm”). The latter served as a reverse proxy for arousal. The
scale ranged from 1 (“I completely disagree”) to 9 (“I completely
agree”). These items correspond to those typically used to infer
basic emotions (e.g., in the Differential Emotions Scale, see Izard
et al., 1993). Basic emotions have proven to be more informative
than the concept of valence alone to study the effect of emotions
on risky choices (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001).
To reduce potential experimenter demand effects (Orne, 1962)
and to obscure the objective of the emotion ratings from the
participants in the sense of “non-deceptive obfuscation” (Zizzo,
2010), seven additional ratings were acquired that were not
directly related to basic emotional states (e.g., “I slept well last
night”; for the complete list, see Table A3 in the Appendix).
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FIGURE 1 | The sequence of events forming one block in the experiment. Each condition consisted of two such blocks, separated by a short break.
Lottery choice task
For the lottery choice task, we used a variant of the Random
Lottery Pairs procedure (Hey and Orme, 1994). In each trial t,
participants were shown a lottery pair {At , Bt} out of a set of 100
lottery pairs (for the complete list, see Table A1 in the Appendix)
in pseudo-random order. The pseudo-random order differed per
session/condition and per subject.
Each lottery L consisted of two possible, strictly positive pay-
offs (xL,1, xL,2), denoted in euro, and the associated probabilities
(pL,1, pL,2) = (pL,1, 1 − pL,1). We limited our study to the gain
domain for the following reasons: first, neuroimaging and lesion
studies suggest that losses and gains are processed differently in
the human brain (Tom et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2010).
Second, to increase the power for the detection of an effect, a
sufficient number of decision trials is needed. Third, mixed gam-
bles would have required the estimation of additional parameters,
making even more observations necessary. We therefore chose to
dedicate all our experimental trials to only one domain.
The payoffs and probabilities were visualized on screen by a pie
chart (see Figure 1), which is a common graphical representation
of lotteries in this type of experiments (Harrison and Rutström,
2008). Apart from some “catch trials,” we ensured that within
each pair, no lottery first-order stochastically dominated the other
lottery.
The lotteries differed from each other in their riskiness. A
lottery can be considered riskier than another lottery if it can
be expressed as a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of the other
lottery (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). Since risk averters dis-
like the wider spread, making them choose the riskier lottery
requires adding some compensation for the wider spread—a “risk
premium”—to the riskier lottery. We denote this risk premium
by m. Within a lottery pair {At , Bt}, we thus call the lottery
At the riskier lottery if it has a wider spread than Bt , such that
At = MPS(Bt) + mt (mt being a sure payoff)1.
1We obtain qualitatively identical results if we consider variance as the risk
measure—i.e., if we take the presence of a mean–variance trade-off as the cri-
terion for one lottery (the one with the higher variance, but also the higher
average payoff) to be riskier than the other. A wider spread implies increased
variance, but not vice versa, so that the two measures coincide in many but
not all of our trials.
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The set of lottery pairs was designed to allow estimating pref-
erence parameters with relatively high precision in the range that
has been found in previous studies (see, e.g., the examples given in
Harrison and Rutström, 2008; Table 5 in Stott, 2006). That is, for
degrees of risk aversion usually observed in lab experiments, we
expected participants to sometimes choose the riskier and some-
times the less risky lottery. In addition, the payoffs of our lotteries
were associated with probabilities spanning 10 to 90% to cover
a broad enough range to reliably estimate the parameters of the
probability weighting function.
Positioning of the lotteries on screen was counterbalanced
within-subject: in some trials, the riskier lottery was presented
in the upper half of the screen, and sometimes in the lower one.
Moreover, we counterbalanced the position of the larger payoff
on screen between-subjects: for half of the participants, the larger
payoff was illustrated by the left side, and for the other half, by the
right side of the pie chart.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Emotion ratings
To check whether the experimental manipulation had the desired
emotional effects, we calculated repeated-measures ANOVAs
using the four conditions as the within-subject factor. As depen-
dent variables in these ANOVAs we used the ratings in three
affective dimensions (happiness, sadness, and calmness). For each
dimension, we analyzed the ratings obtained immediately after
the musical stimulation (“post-music ratings”). In these analyses,
we used the average of the two post-music ratings per condition
and per participant. We also calculated an ANOVA for the aver-
age post-choice ratings to investigate if emotional effects persisted
over time.
Lottery choices
Relative frequency with which the riskier lottery was chosen.We
analyzed how often the riskier of the lotteries included in a pair
was chosen in those trials in which one lottery is riskier than the
other according to the measure explained above. This is the most
basic measure of the influence of music-evoked emotions on risk
attitudes.
These choice frequencies were compared across the four con-
ditions. To establish whether there are significant differences
between the four conditions, we estimated linear probability
models (LPMs)2. That is, we regressed choice of the riskier lot-
tery on condition dummies. Let us denote participant i’s choice
in trial t by ri,t , and set ri,t = 1 if the riskier lottery was cho-
sen by i in trial t, and ri,t = 0 otherwise. The regression equation
then is
ri,t = βhap,i + δβ,nomDnom,i,t + δβ,tonDton,i,t
+ δβ,sadDsad,i,t + εi,t .
βhap is the relative frequency at which the riskier lottery
was chosen in the “happy” condition (which here serves as
2Using a probit or logit model instead of the linear probability model yields
qualitatively identical results. However, the estimates obtained via an LPM are
easier to interpret.
the reference condition). δβ,nom captures the difference in
the choice of the riskier lottery in the “no music” con-
dition vis-à-vis the “happy” condition, while δβ,ton does
the same for the “random tone sequences” condition, and
δβ,sad for the “sad” condition. D is the respective condi-
tion dummy regressor, and εi,t is an error term with mean
zero. Our regression allowed for heterogeneity in risk aver-
sion in the reference category between subjects i via indi-
vidual random effects in the regression’s constant term, here
βhap,i.
A more versatile regression also included regressors di,t mea-
suring how many trials had passed since the last musical stimula-
tion. This was done to investigate whether the effect of the evoked
emotions on risk attitudes diminished over time. We denote the
associated coefficients by τβ,cond:
ri,t = βhap,i + τβ,hapdi,tDhap,i,t +
(
δβ,nom + τβ,nomdi,t
)
Dnom,i,t
+ (δβ,ton + τβ,tondi,t)Dton,i,t
+ (δβ,sad + τβ,saddi,t)Dsad,i,t + εi,t .
To simplify comparison of the more extensive model with the
reduced model, the regressor di,t was centered.
Participants failed to respond in only 72 out of 41 × 4 × 100 =
16,400 trials (0.439%), such that we had to omit these trials in
the analysis. In the LPMs, the number of observations is lower,
since not all trials featured a “risky–less risky” trade-off as defined
above via mean-preserving spreads; 70 out of the 100 lottery pairs
we used involved a trade-off of this kind (while others involved,
e.g., mean–variance trade-offs).
We compared several models, which differed in the number
of random effects—i.e., individual random effects were included
either only in the baseline risk aversion or also in the between-
condition changes and/or in the time trends. The two models
described in detail above yielded the lowest Bayesian Information
Criteria (BICs).
Structural regressions. To find out whether changes in partici-
pants’ choices between conditions can indeed be attributed to
changes in probability weighting, we estimated structural regres-
sion models (see, e.g., Harrison and Rutström, 2008, section 2.2;
Wilcox, 2011). These are based on cumulative prospect theory
(CPT). In CPT, monetary payoffs and the probability of receiv-
ing these payoffs are transformed into subjective values via a
value (utility) function u and a probability weighting function w,
respectively.
If participants assign a subjective value V to a lottery in line
with CPT, probability weighting is applied to the probability of
the larger payoff (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). That is, if
we denote the larger payoff in lottery L = (xL,1, pL,1; xL,2, pL,2)
by xL,1, the subjective value V is given by
V(L; θ) ≡ w (pL,1; θw) u (xL,1; θu)+ [1 − w (pL,1; θw)] u (xL,2; θu) .
θ is a vector combining the parameter vectors θw and θu that
determine the shape of the probability weighting function and the
shape of the utility function, respectively. It is these parameters
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and their potential modulation by the emotional state that we are
interested in.
Regarding the transformation of the payoffs, we assume—in
line with many previous studies (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman,
1992)—a power utility function3, i.e.,
u (x; θu) = u(x; ρ) = x1− ρ,
such that a larger ρ goes along with increased curvature of the
utility function—i.e., all other things equal, increased risk aver-
sion4. For the probability-weighting function, we use a popular
two-parameter version (Prelec, 1998),
w
(
p; θw
) = w (p; α, β) = exp{−β(− log p)α}.
Here, w(p; α, β) is the decision weight, p is the objective prob-
ability, and α and β are parameters. Two-parameter versions of
probability weighting have found broad empirical support due
to their ability to explain individual differences or differences
between choice domains (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui,
2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Capra
et al., 2012). Importantly, the two parameters are moreover
thought to reflect different psychological phenomena (see, e.g.,
Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). The parameter α primarily influ-
ences the slope of the probability weighting function: for β = 1,
α < 1 results in overweighting of small and underweighting of
large probabilities, with the consequence of relative insensitivity
[∂w(p; α, 1)/∂p < 1] in the intermediate range. The parameter
β primarily reflects the elevation of the weighting function and
can be interpreted as reflecting the “attractiveness” of gambling:
for α = 1, β > 1 results in an underweighting of all probabili-
ties [w(p; 1, β) < p]. That is, in CPT, a less elevated weighting
function assigns a lower decision weight to the higher outcome—
see the formula for V (L; ρ, α, β). This has also been interpreted
as a form of “pessimism” (in Fehr-Duda et al., 2011). Through
the reduced decision weight on the higher lottery outcome,
reduced elevation of the probability weighting function translates
to greater risk aversion.
Based on this, for each lottery pair {A, B}, the difference in
the subjective values,V(A,B; θ) ≡ V(A; θ) − V(B; θ), is deter-
mined. A decision maker whose preferences can be represented
by the subjective value function V chooses A over B whenever the
subjective value ofA is larger than that ofB, i.e.,V(A,B; θ) > 0,
and vice versa. Of course, participants do not make choices that
are perfectly consistent with the assumed model. The most fre-
quently used binary-choice regressions—the logit and the probit
specification—account for this by mapping the difference in sub-
jective valuation,V(A,B; θ), to choice probabilities via a strictly
3We tried different specifications of the utility function. All yielded compara-
ble fits, but power utility performed best (in line with the findings by Stott,
2006).
4To be precise, we used power utility of the form u(x; ρ) = (x1− ρ − 1)/
(1 − ρ). This is completely equivalent to the often used u(x; r) = xr , with
r = 1 − ρ. The main advantage of using 1 − ρ as the exponent is the intuitive
meaning of ρ: an increase in ρ indicates an increase in risk aversion—whereas
for xr , a decrease in r indicates an increase in risk aversion.
increasing, symmetric (“sigmoid”) link function F. Formally,
Pr[A|{A,B}; θ, σ] = F[V(A,B; θ)/σ] and
Pr[B|{A,B}; θ, σ] = 1 − F[V(A,B; θ)/σ].
We use the logit specification, such that the link function F is the
logistic distribution function, F[V] = 1/[1 + e−V ]5.
The parameter σ governs the dispersion (flatness) of the link
function. It is often called the Fechner noise parameter (see
Harrison and Rutström, 2008). The larger σ (i.e., the more noise),
the smaller the fraction gets, with the effect that σ → ∞ is equiv-
alent to random choice (i.e., F → ½). Conversely, σ → 0 means
that no noise is present in participants’ choices from the perspec-
tive of the model, and the choice probabilities converge to a step
function.
Based on both theoretical and econometric considerations, it
has been suggested to modify this common approach (Wakker,
2010, p. 85; Wilcox, 2011), because it suffers from the fact that
the utility assigned to a certain payoff in expected utility theory
or CPT is only unique up to an affine transformation (Wilcox,
2011, p. 90). However, the common approach effectively takes
the ordinal quantity subjective utility to be a cardinal quantity.
Wilcox (2011) shows that this has the consequence that being
“more risk-averse” in the theoretical sense (Pratt, 1964) and being
“stochastically more risk-averse” do not coincide: it is easy to find
pairs, e.g., of a lottery B and a sure payoff A = E[B] for which
the difference in subjective valuation, V , approaches zero if
one increases the degree of risk aversion (ρ ↑). Consequently, the
predicted probability of choosing either alternative approaches
½—which is non-sensical, since greater risk aversion (ρ ↑) should
imply a predicted probability of choosing the sure payoff that
increases and approaches one.
A remedy to this problem is to replace the difference in subjec-
tive valuation,V , by the difference between the certainty equiv-
alents of these valuations (Wakker, 2010, p. 85; Von Gaudecker
et al., 2011, p. 676)—i.e., sure amounts of money that carry the
same subjective value as the lotteries. Under power utility, the
certainty equivalent of a subjective value V is given by
CE(L; θ) ≡ u−1 [V(L; θ); ρ] .
=
{
[(1 − ρ)V(L; θ) + 1]1/(1− ρ) if ρ = 1
exp[V(L; θ)] if ρ = 1.
We can then define, for each lottery pair {A, B}, the difference in
the certainty equivalents, CE(A,B; θ) = CE(A, θ) − CE(B, θ).
With this, the specification of the CPT-based latent-variable
model becomes:
Pr[A|{A,B}; θ, σ] = F[CE(A,B; θ)/σ].
Let Ct denote the lottery that was actually chosen in trial t, and
let 1At be the indicator function such that 1At (Ct) = 1 if At was
5Using a probit instead of a logit specification leads to negligible changes. Like
Stott (2006), we found the logit model to provide the best fit.
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chosen and 0 if Bt was chosen in t. The few trials in which par-
ticipants failed to respond (72 out of 16,400) are omitted from
the analysis. Let Dcond,t be a dummy regressor that equals 1
only in trials t belonging to the respective condition cond and
0 otherwise; for instance, when choosing the “happy” condition
as the reference condition, the dummy regressors would cover
cond ∈{“no music,” “random tones,” “sad music”}. T is the total
number of trials in the experiment.
Non-linear maximum likelihood estimation maximizes the
log-likelihood
(θ,θ, σ, δσ) ≡
∑T
t = 1
{
1At (Ct) log F
[
CE(At ,Bt ;θ + ∑cond δθ,condDcond,t)
σ + ∑cond δσ,condDcond,t
]
+
{1 − 1At (Ct)} log
{
1 − F
[
CE(At ,Bt ;θ + ∑cond δθ,condDcond,t)
σ + ∑cond δσ,condDcond,t
]}}
.
That is, (θˆ,̂θ, σˆ, δˆσ) ≡ arg max(θ,θ, σ, δσ). θ and σ are the
preference and noise parameters that describe behavior in the
reference condition. The matrix θ and the vector δσ capture
the changes in θ and the changes in the Fechner noise parame-
ter σ, respectively, between the reference condition and the three
remaining conditions.
We compared a full model that permitted condition-wise
changes in both the value function parameter (ρ) and the prob-
ability weighting function parameters (α, β) with a more par-
simonious model that only allowed for changes in probability
weighting. To account for between-subject heterogeneity in the
valuation of outcomes and in probability weighting, these regres-
sions allowed for individual random effects in ρ, α, and β.
Allowing for changes in the curvature of the value function did
not significantly improve the model’s fit to the data, as assessed
by a likelihood-ratio test. Therefore, we report the parameter
estimates of the more parsimonious model in detail. F-statistics
were calculated, and individual coefficients were tested for signif-
icance.
Complementary structural regressions. We investigated the link
between incidental emotions and probability weighting in a com-
plementary way by using participants’ self-reported happiness
ratings as explanatory variables. Specifically, we calculated for
each participant the average of the four happiness ratings in
the “no music” condition and used this individual average as a
between-subject regressor. The average score of the “no music”
condition represents baseline happiness, as there was no experi-
mental manipulation of affect in this condition. We then calcu-
lated, for each participant, the deviation of the condition-specific
happiness ratings (i.e., one value per condition, calculated as
the average of the four ratings obtained per condition) from
his/her individual baseline happiness; this deviation served as a
within-subject regressor.
In other words, this regression allowed us to investigate (a)
whether participants who are happier in general exhibit more/less
pronounced probability weighting, and (b) whether the music-
evokedwithin-subjectvariationinreportedhappinessalsopredicts
theextentofprobabilityweighting for the respective trials.Both the
curvature and the elevation of the probability weighting function
were modeled as depending on the condition-specific happiness
ratings, whereas the curvature of the value function was assumed
to be invariant across conditions. Our hypothesis was that both
the between-subject and the within-subject effect would point in
the same direction: the greater self-reported happiness, the lower
the degree of probabilistic pessimism. The same procedure was
used for the individual sadness and calmness ratings.
RESULTS
MUSIC-EVOKED INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS
To test whether participants’ emotional states were altered by
our experimental manipulation, we compared the self-reported
emotions between the conditions. As expected, participants’ self-
reported happiness was affected by the music that they had
listened to (see Figure 2). Immediately after musical stimulation
(“post-music”), participants’ self-reported happiness varied sig-
nificantly between conditions [F(3, 120) = 2.745, p = 0.046]. This
effect vanished until the second emotion rating at the end of
a block, approximately 10min later [“post-choice”; F(3, 120) =
0.816, p = 0.487]. This is consistent with a diminishing intensity
of evoked incidental emotions over time.
As expected, pairwise comparisons revealed that immediately
after the musical stimulation, participants reported to be hap-
pier when they had listened to happy music than to sad music
[t(40) = 2.219, p = 0.032]. This also holds for the comparison
between happy music and random tone sequences [t(40) = 2.877,
p = 0.006]. Reported happiness for random tone sequences was
not significantly different from reported happiness for sad music
[t(40) = −0.047, p = 0.962]. Taken together, this indicates that
the “random tone sequences” condition was affectively more
FIGURE 2 | Subjective happiness ratings across the four conditions.
Darker bars illustrate the values immediately after musical stimulation
(“post-music”); brighter bars illustrate the values after the lottery choice
blocks (“post-choice”). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The
scale ranged from 1 (not happy at all) to 9 (very happy). An asterisk
indicates significant difference at the 5% level.
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similar to the “sad” condition rather than being affectively neu-
tral. No other differences were significant (all p > 0.149).
Mirroring the lowest happiness ratings, sadness ratings were
highest in the “sad” condition. The within-subject effect for con-
dition was only marginally significant, however, for the ratings
taken directly after the musical stimulation [F(3, 120) = 2.190,
p = 0.093]. This trend toward significance might be due to a
difference between the “sad” and “no music” condition [t(40) =
2.41, p = 0.021], indicating that sad music was associated with
greater sadness than no experimental manipulation (no music).
The remaining comparisons were, however, not significant (all
p > 0.152). Differences in the post-choice ratings were also not
significant [F(3, 120) = 1.759, p = 0.159].
Calmness ratings, which we consider an inverse indicator
of arousal, did not show any significant post-music differ-
ences [F(3, 120) = 1.435, p = 0.236] or post-choice differences
[F(3, 120) = 1.251, p = 0.294].
In summary, ratings reveal that music differentially altered
the emotional state of happiness and that this effect dimin-
ished over time. Happy music was associated with greater hap-
piness, whereas sad music and random tone sequences were
associated with lower happiness compared to the “happy”
condition.
LOTTERY CHOICES
Choice of the riskier lottery
Participants chose the riskier lottery most often in the “happy”
condition and least often in the “sad” condition. The relative fre-
quencies of the riskier lottery being chosen in the four conditions
are visualized in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 | Comparison of the frequencies with which the riskier
lottery was chosen across the four conditions in the first 25 trials of a
block following musical stimulation (1st half) and in the remaining 25
trials of a block (2nd half). (Please note that this chart is shown only for
illustrative purposes and is not used for statistical inference, because the
statistical analysis needs to account for both between-subject and
within-subject variation; see the description of LPM 1 and LPM 2 in the
“Materials and methods” section.)
Linear probability models (LPMs) were used to test whether
these differences are statistically significant. In contrast to LPM
1, LPM 2 not only allows for analyzing the average effect of the
conditions on choices, but it also permits analysis of the initial
effects—i.e., the estimated frequency at which participants chose
the riskier lottery immediately following musical stimulation—
and time trends.
F-tests for overall condition effects were significant for
both models [LPM 1: F(3, 11444) = 4.7725, p = 0.0025; LPM 2:
F(3, 11440) = 4.8329, p = 0.0023], indicating differences in risk
attitudes between the conditions. The results are presented in
Table 1. As hypothesized, the “happy” and the “sad” condition
were the two extreme conditions, with the riskier lottery being
chosen most often in the “happy” condition.
These two conditions differed from each other significantly
(p = 0.0013) in LPM 1. The “happy” condition also differed
significantly from “random tones” (p = 0.0053). In addition,
the “sad” (p = 0.0192) and the “random tones” condition (p =
0.0464) were associated with higher risk aversion than “nomusic.”
These results carry over to LPM 2, except that for the differ-
ence between “random tones” and “no music” there was only a
trend toward significance (p = 0.0509). In LPM 2, the estimated
initial effects—i.e., choice of the riskier lottery immediately after
having listened to the music—are even more pronounced than
the average effects in both LPMs.
The estimated time trends in LPM 2 show that participants
became more risk-averse over time when they started out with
relatively low risk aversion (i.e., in the “happy” and “no music”
Table 1 | Random-effects linear probability models for the choice of
the riskier lottery across the four conditions.
Condition LPM 1 LPM 2
Average Average Initial Time
frequency frequency frequency trend
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Happy music 47.40tones,sad 47.48tones,sad 50.50tones,sad −0.120,tones,sad
No music 46.48tones,sad 46.43sad 49.11tones,sad −0.11sad
Random tones 44.20happy,no 44.20happy 43.12happy,no +0.04happy
Sad music 43.72happy,no 43.75happy,no 40.27happy,no +0.140,happy,no
LPM 1 included only dummy regressors to detect differences between the con-
ditions. In addition to that, LPM 2 also modeled the temporal distance from
the last musical stimulation (as the number of trials completed since the last
musical stimulation). The “time trends” column thus indicates by how much (in
percentage points) the relative frequency at which the riskier lottery was chosen
changed on average with each additional completed trial. t-tests were used to
assess whether the parameter estimates are different from 0.
Significance at p < 0.05 indicated via superscripts:
happy significantly different from the “happy music” condition; nosignificantly
different from the “no music” condition; tonessignificantly different from the
“random tone sequences” condition; sad significantly different from the “sad
music” condition; 0significantly different from zero (for the time trends).
To account for individual differences in participants’ risk taking, individual random
effects were included for the respective reference condition.
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conditions), and they became less risk-averse over time when
starting out with relatively high risk aversion (i.e., in the “random
tone sequences” and “sad music” conditions). The time trends are
significantly different from zero for the two most extreme con-
ditions, i.e., the “happy” (p = 0.0256) and the “sad” condition
(p = 0.0130), and there was a trend toward significance for no
music (p = 0.0509). At the end of each block, there were no sig-
nificant differences in the choice frequencies between conditions
anymore (all pairwise p > 0.21). This is what one would expect
for a diminishing emotional influence over time. An F-test rejects
the hypothesis that time had no influence on choices [F(4, 11440) =
3.8951, p = 0.0037]. The estimates for several conditions differed
significantly from each other (see Table 1).
In summary, analysis of the relative frequency with which par-
ticipants chose the riskier lottery provides evidence in favor of an
influence of music-evoked incidental emotions on risk attitudes.
Structural regressions
To test our hypothesis that the influence of incidental emotions
on risk attitudes can be explained through changes in probabil-
ity weighting, we estimated preference parameters via structural
regression models. First, we estimated a full model that simulta-
neously allowed for between-condition changes in the curvature
of the value function (ρ) and in the probability weighting param-
eters (α, β). The full model revealed an overall (jointly) significant
effect of music-evoked emotions on the estimated preference
parameters [F(9, 16304) = 3.1268, p = 0.0009].
Allowing for between-condition changes in the value function
parameter (ρ) did, however, not significantly improve the model
fit compared to a reduced model that only allowed for changes
in the probability weighting parameters (log-likelihood ratio =
1.0159, p = 0.7974). This indicates that—as to be expected based
on theoretical considerations—changes in the curvature of the
value function do not explain additional variation in participants’
decisions beyond what is explained by changes in probability
weighting. As a consequence, we focused on the more parsimo-
nious model6.
According to this reduced model, there was a significant
effect of music-evoked emotions on the estimated preference
parameters [F(6, 16307) = 4.5233, p = 0.0001]. Changes in the
elevation parameter β were significant between the “happy”
and the “sad” and the “happy” and the “random tones” con-
dition, respectively (see Table 2), as well as between “sad” and
“no music” (−0.0614; p = 0.001) and “random tones” to “no
music” (−0.417, p = 0.0243)7. No between-condition changes in
the sensitivity parameter α reached significance (all p-values >
0.49). That is, listening to happy music was associated with a
significant increase in the elevation of the probability weight-
ing function—i.e., higher (more optimistic) decision weights of
the larger outcomes—compared to listening to random tone
sequences and to sad music. Listening to sad music and random
6We did not include time trends in this model, because this would have dou-
bled the already large number of probability-weighting–related parameters to
be estimated from 8 to 16.
7The between-condition changes in the elevation parameter β remain signifi-
cant also when not allowing α to vary between the conditions.
Table 2 | Structural regression model: estimates of preference
parameters—sensitivity and elevation of the probability weighting
function in the “happy music” condition as well as changes of the
parameters in the remaining conditions.
Condition Coefficient p-value
ρ: CURVATURE OF VALUE FUNCTION
Average over all conditions 0.2467 0.006
α: SENSITIVITY OF PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION
Happy music (reference condition) 0.5476 <0.001 (H0: α = 1)
 No music +0.0035 0.864
 Random tones −0.0105 0.603
 Sad music +0.0017 0.934
β: ELEVATION OF PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION
Happy music (reference condition) 1.3003 0.002 (H0: β = 1)
 No music +0.0154 0.392
 Random tones +0.0576 0.002
 Sad music +0.0769 <0.001
σ: FECHNER NOISE
Average over all conditions 0.6945 <0.001
Wald tests were used to assess whether the parameter estimates are different
from 0. While the benchmark for the curvature of the value function is 0 (ρ = 0 in
the case of a linear value function), it is 1 for the other two parameters (α = 1 and
β = 1 in the absence of probability weighting). Thus, except for α and β, each
statistical test reported here was calculated under the null hypothesis (H0) that
the coefficient equals 0. A decrease in α indicates a decrease in the sensitivity
to variation in probability; an increase in β indicates a decrease in the elevation
of the probability weighting function. Individual random effects were included
in α, β, ρ, and σ , but not in the between-condition changes. A logit regression
model was used. Please note that our results can be compared to studies that
used u(x; r) = xr by calculating r = 1 − ρ.
tones was also associated with lower (more pessimistic) decision
weights than not listening to any music. The respective probabil-
ity weighting functions are illustrated in Figure 4. A regression
in which we interacted the between-condition regressors with a
gender dummy revealed no significant difference in the effect of
emotions on the probability weighting of men and women.
To assess the magnitude of the observed effects, it is useful to
translate the changes in preference parameters into changes in
monetary units. Based on the estimated preference parameters—
including the individual random effects—and the estimated
between-condition changes in these parameters, it is possible
to calculate the (subjective) certainty equivalents of all the lot-
teries presented to the participants across trials. One can then
calculate the risk premium for each lottery, which is defined as
the difference between the expected value of a lottery and its
certainty equivalent. When averaging across lotteries and across
participants, we find that the mean risk premium implied by the
estimated parameters is C1.34 (14.05% of the mean expected
value) in the “sad” condition, while it is C1.24 (12.93%) in the
“happy” condition. This means that the average risk premium is
8.17% (1.12 percentage points) higher after listening to the sad
music compared to the happy music used in our experiment.
We further investigated the link between incidental emotions
and risk attitudes in a complementary fashion by estimating
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FIGURE 4 | Probability weighting functions in the four conditions based on the parameter estimates for the structural regression model reported
in Table 2.
participants’ probability weighting parameters as functions
of their individual happiness ratings (for the results, see
Table 3). Put differently, the regression included two explanatory
variables—between-subject differences in average happiness in
the “no music” condition and within-subject deviation from this
average resulting from the musical stimulation.
We found a significant relationship between the within-subject
regressor—i.e., the music-evoked variation in happiness—and
the elevation of the probability weighting function (p = 0.003).
Specifically, the happier participants were, the more elevated their
probability weighting function was, resulting in decreased risk
aversion with increasing happiness.
As expected, this pattern was also found for the between-
subject variation observed in the “no music” condition (although
here the associated coefficient did not reach significance, p =
0.143): participants who were happier in the “no music” condi-
tion tended to be less risk-averse, indicated by a more elevated
probability weighting function.
While the latter—between-subject—finding is correlational,
the former—within-subject—finding again supports the inter-
pretation that evoked emotions causally influence risk attitudes.
As far as calmness is concerned, we only found a trend toward
significance for participants who were overall less calm/more
aroused to have a more elevated probability weighting function
(p = 0.068). Importantly, we did not observe an analogous effect
for the music-evoked (within-subject) changes in arousal (p =
0.276). We also did not find any significant effect of self-reported
sadness on the elevation parameter of the probability weighting
function—neither for the between-subject regressor (p = 0.666)
nor for the within-subject regressor (p = 0.185). Hence, we found
happiness to be the only emotional experience that was related to
the elevation parameter of the probability weighting function at
the individual level.
In summary, the results of our structural regressions con-
firmed the observed differences in how often the riskier lottery
was chosen in the “happy” condition on the one hand and the
“sad” and “random tone sequences” conditions on the other
hand. Importantly, however, the structural regressions go beyond
that by showing that the changes in participants’ choices can be
explained through changes in how they convert objective prob-
abilities into subjective decision weights—in particular through
changes in the elevation parameter of the assumed probability
weighting function. The hypothesized affective nature of this link
is corroborated by our finding that both self-reported happiness
in the “no music” condition and music-evoked changes in hap-
piness were positively related to the elevation of the probability
weighting function and thus negatively related to risk aversion.
DISCUSSION
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
is a theory of decisionmaking under risk that is very prominent in
both psychology and economics. In this framework, risk attitudes
are understood as arising from an interplay between subjective
valuation of (monetary) outcomes and probability weighting.
Previous studies have demonstrated an affect-congruent influ-
ence of incidental emotions on the assessment of unknown prob-
abilities of potential events, for example, more optimistic judg-
ments in happy participants and more pessimistic probabilistic
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Table 3 | Structural regression model: estimates of preference parameters—sensitivity and elevation of the probability weighting function as
functions of the between-subject and within-subject variation in self-reported happiness.
Self-reported happiness Coefficient p-value
ρ: CURVATURE OF VALUE FUNCTION
Average over all conditions and participants 0.3418 <0.001
α: SENSITIVITY OF PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION
Average in “no music” condition over all participants 0.5900 <0.001 (H0: α = 1)
Deviation of participants’ average in “no music” condition from cross-subject mean (between-subject regressor) +0.0093 0.683
Deviation of participants’ block-specific rating from “no music” condition (within-subject regressor) −0.0221 0.180
β: ELEVATION OF PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION
Average in “no music” condition over all participants 1.1393 0.198 (H0: β = 1)
Deviation of participants’ average in “no music” condition from cross-subject mean (between-subject regressor) −0.0437 0.143
Deviation of participants’ block-specific rating from “no music” condition (within-subject regressor) −0.0853 0.003
σ: FECHNER NOISE
Average over all conditions and participants 1.0471 <0.001
Wald tests were used to assess whether the parameter estimates are different from 0. While the benchmark for the curvature of the value function is 0 (ρ = 0 in
the case of a linear value function), it is 1 for the other two parameters (α = 1 and β = 1 in the absence of probability weighting). Thus, except for α and β, each
statistical test reported here was calculated under the null hypothesis (H0) that the coefficient equals 0. A decrease in α indicates a decrease in the sensitivity to
variation in probability; an increase in β indicates a decrease in the elevation of the probability weighting function. The standard errors—and thus the associated
p-values—were adjusted for 41 clusters on the subject level. A logit regression model was used. Please note that our results can be compared to studies that used
u(x; r) = xr by calculating r = 1 − ρ.
judgments in sad participants (Johnson and Tversky, 1983;
Wright and Bower, 1992). We hypothesized that such an effect
would also exist on probability weighting in decision making
under risk.
We found experimental evidence in favor of a causal effect
of incidental emotions on risk attitudes that is consistent with
changes in probability weighting. To measure risk attitudes and
probability weighting, we employed a variant of the Random
Lottery Pairs procedure (Hey and Orme, 1994) and varied both
outcomes and probabilities of real monetary gambles in the
gain domain. Participants’ incidental emotions were manipulated
within-subject by listening to happy and sad music as well as
random tone sequences or no music at all, and evaluated by
self-reported emotional ratings.
Our two-step statistical analysis yielded that participants’ deci-
sions differed between conditions and that these differences can
be explained by changes in probability weighting. First, we com-
pared the choice frequencies between conditions. Risk aversion
decreased from the “happy” to the “random tones” and “sad”
conditions. Second, we allowed for emotion-dependent changes
in the probability weighting function in a structural regression
rooted in CPT. We found a significantly higher elevation in
the “happy” than in the “sad” and the “random tones” condi-
tion. That is, participants made decisions as if the probabilities
of the larger payoffs received a higher decision weight in the
“happy” condition and lower weights in the other two. This could
be regarded as a form of optimism or pessimism, respectively.
Listening to sad music and random tones was also associated with
more pessimism than not listening to any music. The sensitivity
parameter was not affected. Thus, affectively mediated changes
in risky choices do not seem to result from altered sensitivity to
probability changes but from a change in decision weights across
probabilities.
Several arguments support the claim that these effects can
be attributed to incidental emotions. First, the effects corre-
spond closely to differences in self-reported happiness between
these conditions. Happy music was associated with greater happi-
ness, whereas sad music and random tones were associated with
decreased happiness. Second, we found that the effect on deci-
sions diminished over time—just as the effect on self-reported
happiness. Third, music-evoked happiness correlated positively
with the estimated elevation of the probability weighting func-
tion: when happiness was greater, the larger payoffs received a
higher decision weight; when happiness was reduced, the larger
payoffs received a lower decision weight. Taken together, this evi-
dence is compatible with an effect of incidental emotions on the
elevation of the probability weighting function during decision
making under risk.
Our results are consistent with well-established effects of
incidental emotions on probability judgments reported in the
psychological literature. For instance, happy people make more
optimistic probabilistic judgments, while sad people make more
pessimistic judgments (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Wright and
Bower, 1992). Extending this body of evidence, our results suggest
that not only judgments of unknown probabilities are altered, but
that also the weighting of known probabilities in decision making
under risk is affected by incidental emotions.
This is in line with indirect evidence that suggests an effect of
incidental emotions on probability weighting. In a correlational
study, Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) found that women that regarded
the current day to be more promising than usual made decisions
as if they weighted the larger payoffs more optimistically. This has
been interpreted as an effect of mood on the elevation of the prob-
ability weighting function in women. In a similar vein, weather
and seasonal effects on decision making were attributed to the
effect of bad mood on probability weighting (Kliger and Levy,
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2008)—importantly, however, without distinguishing between
sensitivity and elevation of the probability weighting function.
We complement this research in important ways by going
beyond correlational data and providing evidence in favor of a
causal effect of incidental emotions on risk attitudes that is consis-
tent with changes in probability weighting in particular. Critically,
we experimentally manipulated participants’ incidental emo-
tions. Moreover, we recorded participants’ self-reported emotions
to make sure that the experimental manipulation worked as
intended. Taken together, this is evidence in favor of a causal
effect of incidental emotions. Unlike Fehr-Duda et al. (2011), we
found significant effects for our whole mixed-gender sample and
no significant difference between men and women. Thus, gender
does not seem to be the major determining factor in the effect of
emotions on risk attitudes. Similar to the correlational evidence
reported in Fehr-Duda et al. (2011), increased baseline happiness
was associated with a more elevated probability weighting func-
tion, although not significantly so. This between-subject effect is
also in line with the finding that people with high life satisfaction
are more willing to take risks (German Socio-Economic Panel;
Dohmen et al., 2011).
At first glance, our results may seem inconsistent with the
findings of Isen et al. (1988). Isen et al. did not report a sig-
nificant effect of evoked positive affect on risk attitudes in the
gain domain. Their Figure 1 displays estimated utility functions
whose curvature is less pronounced in the gain domain for the
positive-affect than for the control participants. This would be
consistent with reduced risk aversion over gains resulting from
positive affect. However, no statistical test was performed to deter-
mine whether this difference was significant. Nevertheless, Isen
et al. speculated that in the gain domain theremight be a tendency
for reduced risk aversion based on more optimistic probability
weighting in happy participants. Importantly, our study provides
empirical evidence for this very conjecture.
Previous research has already provided some theoretical
accounts on the affect sensitivity of the probability weighting
function. The inverse S-shape of the probability weighting func-
tion can result from the presence and integration of anticipatory
emotions—e.g., elation and disappointment—in the decision
process (Gul, 1991; Brandstätter et al., 2002; Walther, 2003).
For instance, Brandstätter et al. (2002) demonstrated that an
inverse S-shaped probability weighting function can be recon-
structed from a so-called surprise function that reflects par-
ticipants’ measured anticipated happiness with regard to the
outcome. In this framework, the anticipated disappointment that
might result from a failure to achieve a highly probable gain is
thought to translate into lower decision weights for high prob-
abilities. In line with this, probability weighting was found to
be more pronounced for outcomes believed to elicit stronger
emotional responses (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001). However, it
has been pointed out that anticipatory emotions could theoret-
ically also alter the elevation of the function at each probability
(Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001). Our results indicate that not just
anticipatory, but also incidental emotions contribute to prob-
ability weighting and that this is reflected in the elevation of
the function. Incidental emotions might have a direct effect on
the processing of probabilities, leading to optimism/pessimism in
terms of decision weights. Alternatively, they might (also) operate
through changing anticipatory emotions that affect the eleva-
tion of the probability weighting function indirectly. Given that
we used very moderate and only positive monetary outcomes
that are unlikely to create strong positive or negative anticipa-
tory emotions—compared to stimuli used in other experiments,
like receiving a kiss or a painful electric shock (Rottenstreich and
Hsee, 2001)—we favor the former interpretation, but we cannot
rule out the latter, indirect, channel.
Our research has several implications for future research. We
have demonstrated that incidental emotions influence choices
between monetary gambles in a way that is compatible with
emotion-induced changes in the subjective weighting of known
probabilities. An important next step would be to explore the
underlying mechanism in greater detail. Process-tracing meth-
ods like eye tracking or (computer) mouse tracking might offer
deeper insights into the psychological processes that underlie
decision making (e.g., Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011) and
affective influences. For instance, it has been shown that happy
participants have a stronger attentional focus on rewards (Tamir
and Robinson, 2007). It is possible that probability weighting ulti-
mately reflects changes in attention to outcome values, as has also
been pointed out by Wu (1999).
Neural data are another promising source of information.
Different brain areas have been related to the processing of the
basic components of gambles, i.e., of rewardmagnitude and prob-
abilities (Tobler et al., 2007). Concerning probability weighting,
previous research has associated non-linear probability weight-
ing with non-linear neural responses in the striatum and anterior
cingulate cortex (Paulus and Frank, 2006; Tobler et al., 2008;
Hsu et al., 2009). Hence, if it is indeed probability weighting
that is affected by incidental emotions, we should see emotion
dependence of these neural responses. For instance, the striatum
and anterior cingulate cortex are also associated with experi-
encing happiness, as a meta-analysis of studies on emotional
processing revealed (Vytal and Hamann, 2010). A link between
rewards and emotions is also plausible, given the association
between activity in the striatum and anticipation of rewards
as well as self-reported happiness generated by these rewards
(Knutson et al., 2001). It is also possible that emotions not
related to the decision at hand—i.e., incidental emotions—have
an influence on reward processing in the striatum. It has been
suggested that conditioned and unconditioned stimuli—and this
would include a wide range of emotional stimuli evoking inci-
dental emotions—influence instrumental, reward-based behavior
via the ventral striatum (Cardinal et al., 2002). Recently, pleasur-
able music has been shown to facilitate reward-based learning,
and the observed effect seems to be linked to striatal activa-
tion (Gold et al., 2013). Thus, we would expect that incidental
emotions influence decision making, and probability weighting
in particular, by altering activity in these brain areas that show
such a functional overlap in reward and emotion processing. This
might reflect the direct integration of incidental emotions into the
decision process.
Obtaining neurobiological measures of emotion-induced
changes in probability weighting are highly promising for future
research, given that from the observation of choices alone, it is
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impossible to disentangle changes in the value function from
changes in probability weighting when using two-outcome lot-
teries only (Wakker, 2010, chapter 5)—unless one restricts the
involved functions to specific parametric forms (in our case,
power utility in combination with Prelec-style two-parameter
probability weighting). Specifically, reduced elevation of the
probability weighting function is observationally equivalent to
an increase in the curvature of the value function: both lead to
increased risk aversion. As a consequence, our findings (and those
of Fehr-Duda et al., 2011) are consistent with changes in probabil-
ity weighting and thus our hypotheses, but not exclusively so, since
the between-condition differences in our participants’ choices can
also be captured by the value function. The analysis of process or
neural data might help disentangling the two possible effects.
Apart from those implications for future research, there are
other methodological considerations and potential limitations
more directly related to our research approach. In contrast to
several previous studies on the influence of incidental affect on
decision making that used between-subject designs (see, how-
ever, e.g., Knutson et al., 2008; Guitart-Masip et al., 2010), we
employed a within-subject design because it has several advanta-
geous features. First, our within-subject design is an ecologically
more valid abstraction of the everyday decision environment of
a person that is confronted with the same decision or similar
decisions repeatedly while being in different affective states. In
contrast, a between-subject design looks at different persons who
make fewer decisions in only one affective state each. Second, a
within-subject design increases statistical power because it pre-
vents between-condition variance from being contaminated by
between-subject variance.
Although within-subject designs potentially introduce con-
founds (e.g., via learning/time trends across sessions), there
are reasons to believe that internal validity with respect to the
effects of interest to our study is ensured, given that learn-
ing would rather diminish than exacerbate between-condition
differences 8. Taken together, we think that the experimental
design that we used creates a balance between ecological and
internal validity.
Regarding the set of lottery pairs, we focused, as already
mentioned, on the gain domain for the following reasons: first,
neuroimaging and lesion studies suggest that losses and gains are
processed differently in the human brain (DeMartino et al., 2010;
but see Tom et al., 2007). Second, to increase the power for the
detection of an effect, a sufficient number of decision trials is
needed. Third, mixed gambles would have required the estima-
tion of additional parameters, making even more observations
necessary. We therefore deliberately chose to dedicate all our
8When checking for time trends across experimental sessions, we found that
subjects became significantly more consistent over time (i.e., the Fechner
error, σ, exhibited a significantly negative time trend), but the estimated prob-
ability weighting parameters showed no significant time trends. Moreover, the
results did not differ qualitatively from those reported in Table 2. To address
potential order effects, we checked whether the initial condition had a last-
ing influence on risk attitudes—which was not the case: when averaging the
individual random effects depending on the condition that subjects first par-
ticipated in, the resulting order of the average random effects in the elevation
parameter for the four conditions corresponded in no way to the order of the
respective estimated condition differences.
experimental trials to only one domain. However, the neuroimag-
ing results just mentioned as well as evidence that probability
weighting might be different in losses (Abdellaoui, 2000) should
motivate future research to investigate the effects of incidental
emotions on decision making in the loss domain.
A final remark on our emotional manipulation procedure is
in order. While the music we used was able to evoke different
levels of happiness, at a small to medium-sized effect, sadness
was not reliably altered (which means that the sad music that
we used was associated with decreased levels of happiness rather
than greater sadness). Other emotion induction techniques might
be more potent and also promising for future research (Gross
and Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg et al., 2007). Alternatively, let-
ting participants bring their own personal music that they know
to evoke the desired emotional state might be a more potent form
of induction, although the use of non-standardized, highly vari-
able stimuli and inadvertently providing information about the
study design to participants in advance might introduce various
confounds.
Apart from this, different measures of emotional change—
for instance, visually supported assessment scales like the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994) or psycho-
physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance response or facial
electromyography)—could be used, because participants might
find it difficult to report their affective states on a numbered scale.
In addition, one could focus on the underlying appraisal dimen-
sions of emotions (see, e.g., Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001). In
this regard, we have found preliminary evidence that arousal is
not the causal emotional dimension, since we did not find a sig-
nificant within-subject association between the calmness ratings
(our inverse proxy for arousal) and risk attitudes.
The type and strength of emotional manipulation in our study
is especially interesting given that everyday life is characterized by
the exposition to many emotional stimuli that are not extreme
in most cases (e.g., listening to music, being smiled at, or meet-
ing more or less liked colleagues; compared to, say, winning a
world championship, witnessing a terrorist attack, or losing a
loved one). Hence, our design has ecological validity with respect
to decision making occurring under standard affective contexts,
i.e., small to moderate emotional changes.
We consider this just as interesting as investigating the effects
of rather big, but uncommon, emotional changes. Intense feel-
ings, especially when being fully recognized, can result in reduced
emotional effects on decision making via an enhanced ability to
control emotional bias (Seo and Barrett, 2007). Evenmore intense
changes in emotion might result in avoiding making a decision
altogether and postponing it to less turbulent times. In contrast,
people may be relatively unaware of the influence of subtle emo-
tional changes on their decisions and hence may be unable to
regulate it. We therefore consider investigating the consequences
of subtle, but common changes in incidental emotions highly
relevant.
CONCLUSION
Our study investigated within-subject the effects of incidental
emotions on probability weighting by means of experimen-
tal manipulation and through measurement of changes in the
affective state. We thereby complement previous studies on the
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effect of incidental emotions on probability judgments as well as
previous—correlational—studies on the link between emotional
states and probability weighting in decision making under risk.
We found experimental evidence in favor of a causal influence of
incidental happiness on risk attitudes. Via structural regressions
based on CPT, we showed that these changes in risk attitudes can
be attributed to affectively mediated changes in the elevation of
the probability weighting function.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Set of lottery pairs.
No. Lottery A Lottery B
xA,1 xA,2 pA,1 xB,1 xB,2 pB,1
1 5 10 0.25 6 9 0.10
2 5 10 0.25 6 9 0.25
3 3 15 0.50 6 9 0.25
4 4 15 0.50 6 9 0.50
5 3 15 0.50 5 10 0.90
6 3 15 0.50 6 10 0.75
7 2 20 0.50 4 12 0.75
8 3 15 0.50 7 9 0.50
9 4 15 0.50 7 9 0.75
10 2 20 0.75 5 10 0.90
11 2 20 0.75 3 15 0.25
12 2 20 0.75 4 15 0.75
13 7 12 0.75 8 10 0.50
14 3 15 0.50 7 12 0.50
15 3 15 0.50 6 12 1.00
16 6 15 0.75 7 9 0.50
17 7 15 0.75 7 9 0.10
18 6 15 0.75 8 8 0.50
19 6 15 0.75 9 9 0.50
20 3 15 0.50 8 10 0.25
21 3 14 0.50 8 10 0.10
22 3 15 0.50 6 9 0.50
23 3 15 0.75 5 10 0.10
24 2 20 0.50 5 10 0.50
25 3 20 0.50 5 10 0.25
26 6 15 0.75 6 10 0.50
27 6 14 0.75 6 10 0.50
28 3 15 0.50 8 8 0.10
29 3 15 0.50 7 7 0.25
30 3 15 0.50 6 15 0.25
31 3 14 0.50 6 15 0.10
32 6 12 0.50 7 9 0.50
33 6 12 0.50 7 9 0.25
34 8 15 0.75 6 10 0.10
35 8 15 0.90 6 10 0.90
36 3 15 0.50 7 9 0.50
37 4 12 0.50 7 9 0.10
38 3 15 0.25 11 11 0.25
39 3 15 0.10 11 11 0.50
40 6 9 0.25 8 10 0.50
41 6 9 0.25 8 10 0.90
42 3 15 0.25 4 12 0.90
43 3 15 0.25 5 12 0.10
44 4 12 0.50 6 9 0.50
45 5 12 0.50 6 9 0.25
46 4 12 0.10 11 11 0.50
47 4 12 0.25 11 11 0.75
48 4 12 0.50 7 12 0.50
49 4 12 0.25 6 10 0.90
(Continued)
Table A1 | Continued
No. Lottery A Lottery B
xA,1 xA,2 pA,1 xB,1 xB,2 pB,1
50 4 12 0.25 6 11 0.10
51 3 15 0.50 6 9 0.25
52 4 15 0.50 6 9 0.25
53 3 15 0.50 7 9 0.50
54 6 12 0.50 6 9 0.90
55 6 12 0.50 6 9 0.75
56 6 12 0.75 6 9 0.75
57 2 20 0.25 13 13 0.50
58 4 20 0.25 13 13 0.75
59 3 15 0.50 7 12 0.90
60 3 15 0.50 7 13 0.25
61 4 12 0.25 8 15 0.75
62 4 12 0.25 8 16 0.50
63 2 20 0.10 17 17 0.50
64 2 20 0.10 16 16 1.00
65 2 20 0.50 7 9 0.50
66 2 20 0.50 7 9 0.10
67 4 12 0.25 9 13 0.50
68 4 12 0.25 9 13 0.50
69 4 12 0.25 5 10 0.25
70 4 12 0.25 5 10 0.10
71 2 20 0.50 7 12 0.50
72 2 19 0.50 6 9 0.10
73 2 20 0.50 6 9 0.50
74 3 15 0.10 13 13 0.25
75 3 15 0.10 13 13 0.50
76 5 10 0.25 7 9 0.50
77 5 10 0.25 7 9 0.10
78 2 20 0.50 3 15 0.25
79 2 20 0.50 3 14 0.25
80 3 15 0.50 4 12 0.10
81 3 15 0.50 5 12 0.50
82 2 20 0.50 4 12 0.25
83 2 20 0.50 4 11 0.10
84 3 15 0.75 4 15 0.90
85 3 15 0.75 5 15 0.50
86 5 10 0.10 9 13 0.10
87 5 10 0.10 9 13 0.25
88 6 10 0.10 9 13 0.50
89 6 11 0.25 4 7 0.50
90 6 12 0.75 4 7 0.90
91 6 11 0.50 3 8 0.90
92 6 11 0.75 3 8 0.10
93 6 8 0.50 3 5 0.50
94 6 9 0.75 4 9 0.25
95 5 9 0.50 4 8 0.50
96 5 5 1.00 3 5 0.75
97 5 7 0.50 4 6 0.50
98 4 6 0.25 3 5 0.90
99 5 8 0.10 5 8 0.75
100 5 7 0.50 4 6 0.75
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Table A2 | Musical stimuli.
Category Composer (Artist) Title
Happy Joel Francisco Perri El Canto de Mi Antara
Craobh Rua The Lucky Penny
Scotch Mist Shetland Tune
Alfredo de Angelis Pregonera
Romanian Folk Dance Batuta de la Adancata
Louis Armstrong St. Louis Blues
Niccoló Paganini Violin Concerto No. 1, 3rd
movement
Jonathan Richman Egyptian Reggae
Johann Joachim Quantz Concerto for Flute and
Orchestra, No. 256 in A Major –
allegro Di Molto
Franz Anton Hoffmeister Concerto for viola and orchestra
in D major: I. Allegro
Georg Friedrich Händel Arrival of the Queen of Sheba
(Sinfonia from the opera
Solomon)
Michael Praetorius Dances from Terpsichore:
6. Volte
Sad Samuel Barber Adagio for Strings
Goran Bregovic and Athens
Symphony Orchestra
Elo Hi (Canto Nero)
Himlar Örn Hilmarsson The Black Dog and the Scottish
Play
Frédéric Chopin
(1837)—Alfred Eschwé and
Razumovsky Sinfonia
Marche funebre from Piano
Sonata No. 2 in B Flat Minor,
Op. 35
The Cure Trust
The Cure Apart
Table A3 | Statements used in the emotion ratings.
German original English translation
Ich bin ruhig. I am calm.
Ich bin sehr neugierig. I am very curious.
Ich habe alles unter Kontrolle. I have everything under control.
Ich bin fröhlich. I am happy.
Ich bin traurig. I am sad.
Ich führe ein stressiges Leben. I lead a stressful life.
Ich fühle mich wohl. I am comfortable.
Ich bin entspannt. I am relaxed.
Ich fühle mich sicher. I feel safe.
Letzte Nacht habe ich gut geschlafen. I slept well last night.
THEORETICAL NOTE
We pointed out that for two-outcome lotteries, it is impossible in
the framework of CPT to dissociate the shape of the value (util-
ity) function from the shape of the probability weighting function
(seeWakker, 2010, chapter 5), unless one restricts the functions to
specific parametric forms.
To be precise, Wakker (2010) shows that the obser-
vational equivalence—or “data equivalence,” as he calls
it—between expected utility with a non-linear utility
function and rank-dependent utility (CPT in the gain
domain) with a non-linear probability weighting function
holds for two-outcome lotteries for which the lower out-
comes are zero. This can be easily extended, however, as
follows:
Let e be the certainty equivalent of a two-outcome lot-
tery that pays a high payoff xh with probability ph and a low
payoff xl, where xh > xl ≥ 0, with probability 1 − ph. Then,
for expected utility, we have u(e) = phu(xh) + (1 − ph)u(xl).
Normalizing u(xh) = 1 and u(xl) = 0, this reduces to u(e) = ph.
Under the assumption that u(x) is strictly increasing in x, this
can be rewritten as e = u−1(ph), where u−1 denotes the inverse
function of u.
Now consider the same certainty equivalent e to be instead
generated by cumulative probability weighting with weighting
function w(p) in combination with linear utility. This gen-
erates the equality e = w(ph)xh + [1 − w(ph)]xl. Rearranging
yields w(ph) = [e − xl]/[xh − xl] = [u−1(ph) − xl]/[xh − xl].
Since u−1(0) = xl and u−1(1) = xh, the w(ph) found in
this way ranges from 0 to 1 and is thus a perfectly valid
probability weighting function. It takes on the shape of the
inverse function of the utility function u(x), normalized in a
suitable way.
Thus, the observational equivalence between expected util-
ity with a non-linear utility function and rank-dependent utility
with a non-linear probability weighting function holds for arbi-
trary two-outcome lotteries—and not only for those whose lower
outcome is zero.
Disentangling the shape of the value (utility) function
and the probability weighting function based on observed
choices alone becomes possible when using lotteries that
consist of at least three outcomes. However, doing so will
still be hard statistically, since the parameters to be esti-
mated continue to be interdependent, albeit to a lesser
degree. For this reason, we suggest (see Discussion) to obtain
additional non-choice data such as process-tracing data or
neural data that might help to disentangle the underlying
processes.
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